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A forum for the expression of readers' views on:
MORALITY IN LEGAL PRACTICE
The fourth problem presented in this section's series was in the
general area of Disclosure. Following the problem solution,' which was
limited by the question presented to the moral obligations of the de-
fendant's attorney, reader comment indicated interest in a discussion
of the moral position of the defendant employer and of the plaintiff-
laborer's attorney.
In the Winter 1959 issue of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER 2 an added note
framed the new issues. It is restated below with the original problem.
The solution by Father William F. Cahill follows.
DISCLOSURE
A sixty-year-old immigrant laborer, admitted to premises to answer
the owner's advertisement for Saturday help, fell because a step col-
lapsed as he stepped upon it. A hitherto competent and reliable employee
of the owner had known the condition of the step and had violated his
employer's instructions to close immediately and repair any passage
found to be unsafe.
The laborer sustained a dislocation of the shoulder and a laceration
of the scalp which required three weeks' hospitalization. For a month
after his discharge from the hospital, he could not return to" his regular
job.
The laborer, who spoke very little English, brought suit against the
owner of the premises where he had fallen. The plaintiff claimed that
the injury to his shoulder was of a serious and disabling nature. He also
claimed that he suffered from headaches as a result of striking his head
at the time of the accident.
Hospital records confirmed that the shoulder injury was sustained
and indicated that four sutures were taken in the scalp. The plaintiff's
attorneys had no medical examination made of their client. Nor did
they ask for copies of the reports made by the physicians employed by
the defendant.
1 Cahill, Solution of the Disclosure Problem, 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 254 (Summer
1958).
25 CATHOLIC LAWYER 84 (Winter 1959).
MORALITY IN LEGAL PRACTICE
The attorney for the defendant had the laborer examined by an
orthopedic specialist, to ascertain the seriousness of the shoulder injury.
In addition, but on the same occasion, examination was made by a
neurologist, to meet the complaint of headaches.
The orthopedist confirmed the hospital report on the shoulder injury.
The neurologist reported to the defendant's attorney that the plaintifj
had not sustained a serious head injury and had no skull fracture, but
that the laborer was suffering from an incurable, always fatal, malady
of the nervous system called Parkinson's disease. The neurologist coun-
selled that while there is now no known cure, the more painful and
disabling stages of the disorder can be delayed in their onset and
ameliorated by drug therapy, avoidance of anxiety and fatigue, regular
exercise and light massage, and psychotherapy. The neurologist indicated
that he did not personally subscribe to the theory that Parkinson's disease
can be caused by trauma. Yet he cautioned the defendant's attorney that
many eminent men in the field believe that trauma can cause Parkinson's
disease and that there is much literature to support this view.
In pretrial conferences it became evident to the defendant's attorney
that the laborer and his attorneys had no knowledge that the plaintiff
was afflicted with Parkinson's disease, and that if the plaintifl's attorneys
suspected that this condition existed, the case could not be disposed of
without a protracted and expensive trial.
The defendant, his attorney and the doctors who made examinations
in their behalf, at no time intimated to the plaintiff or his attorneys the
diagnosis of Parkinson's disease. The court itself, which was instru-
mental in effecting the settlement, was not apprised that this diagnosis
had been made since the defendant's attorney deliberately withheld the
information. On the other hand, he freely turned over to the court and
the plaintiff's attorneys the report of the orthopedic specialist, describing
the shoulder injury only.
As a result of these negotiations, the case was settled between the
parties without a trial. The defendant paid a sum which amply com-
pensated the plaintiff for his shoulder injury, and the plaintiff gave a
general release as to personal injuries, "whether developed or undevel-
oped, resulting or to result," from the accident.
Now, a month after the settlement was made, the defendant's attorney
has come to feel that he may have a moral obligation to aid the plaintiff.
Does such obligation exist, and if so, to what extent?
NOTE
It has been determined that the defendant's attorney is obliged, by
the moral virtue of justice, (a) to compensate the loss which the laborer
sustained in the settlement, which took no account of hils aftllictim of
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Parkinsonism as a probable consequence of the head injury, and (b) to
prevent the harm which will come to the laborer if, while his Parkin-
sonism develops, he is left in ignorance of the character of his affliction.
Now it is asked:
1. Do the plaintiff-laborer's attorneys have obligations similar to those
determined for the defendant's attorney?
2. Does the defendant-employer have similar obligations?
3. In so far as either of the preceding questions is answered affirma-
tively, what are the consequent moral relations of the parties' attor-
neys and the defendant-employer inter sese?
DISCLOSURE AND THE
INCURIOUS ATTORNEYS
WILLIAM F. CAHILL, B.A., LL.B., J.C.D.*
N THE EARLIER DISCUSSION OF THIS CASE, 1 it was determined that the
defendant's attorney incurred two specific moral obligations to the
plaintiff laborer. He is bound to make restitution for the loss which the
plaintiff suffered through the attorney's fraud in the settlement negotia-
tions. He is obliged also to prevent the harm which will come to the
laborer if, while his diseased condition worsens, the deception which
the attorney practiced continues to prevent the laborer from seeking
a proper medical diagnosis.
The Defense Attorney's Duty to Make Restitution for Damages
Unjustly Inflicted
All duties to make restitution for damages one causes unjustly have
three essential premises. We have shown2 that each of these premises
was established by the facts of the case in their reference to the attorney's
defrauding the laborer of a significant factor in his cause of action.
The attorney's active concealment of the neurologist's report in
negotiating the settlement was objectively unjust, for it violated the
plaintiff's strict right to have a compensation proportioned to every
aspect of the claim which he released. This right arose immediately
from the defendant attorney's volunteered representation that his client's
offer of compensation was proportioned to all aspects of the claim known
to him and his client. The report was concealed to induce execution of
a release of the laborer's entire claim, while the consideration actually
given for the release represented compensation for only that part of the
plaintiff's claim which related to the shoulder injury.
* Priest of the Diocese of Albany. Professor of Law, St. John's University School of
Law.
1 Cahill, Solution of the Disclosure Problem, 4 CATHOLiC LAWYER 254 (Summer
1958).
2 ld. at 255; see PRUMMER, HANDBOOK OF MORAL THEOLOGY §§ 270, 271 (Nolan
ed. 1957).
Secondly, the attorney's act efficaciously
caused the plaintiff to lose all opportunity
to exercise his right to sue on the head
injury aspect of his claim. Though the re-
lease may not be legally effective to bar
suit claiming damages for the head injury,
the existence of the general release, in the
circumstances of the case, prevents the
plaintiff and his attorneys from realizing
and exercising this right.
Finally, we determined that the attorney
acted with theological fault 3 when he con-
cealed the neurologist's report, for he then
well knew that his act was: (1) morally
wrong, (2) violative of the plaintiff's strict
right created by the offer of settlement, and
(3) potentially efficacious to bar (in fact,
if not in law) any suit claiming damages
for the head injury. Therefore he acted
with theological fault.
Has the Defendant a Similar Duty
of Restitution?
Now we are asked whether the 'defend-
ant himself has a similar obligation to make
restitution for the loss inflicted upon the
laborer in the dishonest negotiation. The
facts given in the statement are insufficient
to base a judgment that the defendant
knew what his lawyer meant to do, or that
he became aware of the situation before
the settlement was concluded, or, con-
sequently, that he participated in the wrong
with theological fault, knowing his law-
yer's act to be immoral, unjust, and effica-
cious of harm to the laborer.
Yet it is obvious that if the defendant
participated, with theological fault, in his
attorney's immoral and injurious conduct,
he has a duty of restitution exactly parallel
to his lawyer's duty. Provided only that he
3 See Cahill, Solution of the Disclosure Problem,
supra note 1, at 255.
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knew the situation at the time his lawyer
acted, there is no doubt that he must have
participated in the lawyer's act, either by
directing the lawyer to act as he did, or by
advising that course of conduct, or by at
least consenting that his lawyer should so
act. Given that the client was aware of the
situation, the lawyer could not have done
what he did without the client's mandate
or consent, and the client may have ad-
vised the lawyer to. proceed as he did. If
the client participated in any of these ways
in his lawyer's act, he was a positive co-
operator in that act and, as such, he is
bound with the lawyer to make restitution
to the plaintiff. In such a case, there is no
way of assessing to the co-operators portions
or shares of the harm done, for they did
not harm the plaintiff in different ways or
by distinct acts. Each is bound to restore
the whole harm. 4
Yet there is an order of priority between
the obligations of such co-operators. In the
supposition advanced above the defendant's
obligation would be prior to the lawyer's.
Moralists set out this order of co-operators
in respect of their several duties of entire
restitution: (1) the person now enjoying
the benefit of the wrong, (2) the one who
commanded that the wrong be done, (3)
the executor of the wrong, (4) the other
positive co-operators, who counselled the
wrong or consented to it, or commended or
defended it, or had a part in the wrongful
act itself, (5) negative co-operators, who,
in violation of a duty, failed to prevent
the wrong or concealed it.5 Certainly the
defendant is the beneficiary of the laborer's
loss. In that character, and also as man-
dator of the wrong (if such he were in
fact), the defendant's duty is prior to his
4 PRUMMER, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 309, 310.
5 Id. §§ 273, 310.
DISCLOSURE
lawyer's. Thus his lawyer may delay mak-
ing restitution until he is reasonably sure
that his client will not do so.
Even if the defendant did not participate
in his lawyer's misconduct, having been,
perhaps, at that time unaware of how the
negotiations were being conducted, he may
still have a duty of restitution. He may
have come into possession of his immunity
from suit by the laborer without knowing
that the immunity was unjustly procured.
But he may since have come to realize
that it was procured unjustly. In such case,
he has been a "possessor in good faith of
another's goods," and his duty to make
restitution arises when he comes to know
that he enjoys this immunity contrary to
the laborer's rights.6 Here, as in the situa-
tion supposed above, his duty to make
restitution is prior to his lawyer's duty.
Have the Plaintiff's Attorneys
a Similar Duty of Restitution?
The attorneys for the plaintiff did not
participate in the active concealment of the
neurological report. They might be classed
as negative co-operators in the wrongdoing
of the defendant's attorney if they knew or
had any reason to know that he was con-
cealing the report, but none of the given
facts indicates that they had such knowl-
edge. Therefore, if they have a duty to make
restitution to their client analogous to the
duty falling upon the attorney for the de-
fendant, their duty of restitution must have
a different foundation.
The plaintiff's attorneys could have pro-
cured an independent and adequate medi-
cal examination of their client, or they
could have assured themselves that the
examination made by the defendant's doc-
6ld. § 306.
tors was adequate and that its full findings
were made known to them, their client, and
the court. Their omission to do either of
these things violated the strict rights of
their client.
An attorney who engages to represent a
client claiming damages undertakes that
the claim is at least arguable and that he
will advance that claim with skill and zeal.
None of the elements of a cause of action
for bodily injuries can be established, either
in negotiation or on trial, unless the char-
acter and scope of the plaintiff's injuries be
known. To know these things is the first of
all the duties of the plaintiff's attorney.
Without this knowledge, he cannot decide
whether the client has a cause of action,
whether that action will likely succeed on
trial, or what may be a proper monetary
demand on trial or in negotiation for a
release. Thus, without knowing well the
character of the bodily injuries, the attorney
cannot justly advise his client to press or
to abandon the claim, much less can he
assume to negotiate or to sue the claim.
This duty of knowledge does not, of
course, require the attorney to press his in-
quiries to the theoretically possible ulti-
mate. It binds him to use means of inquiry
which are reasonably proportioned to the
character of the injuries, the client's re-
sources, and the opportunities which the
circumstances of the case afford. If, when
a cause is presented to him, an attorney
finds himself unable to pursue the lines of
inquiry thus indicated, he is morally bound
to decline the employment. He is, of course,
unable to pursue the necessary inquiry if
he does not know and has not opportunity
to learn the practical means of inquiry ap-
propriate to the type of case presented.
Here the client alleged a head injury;
the hospital record indicated scalp sutures,
and the patient complained of headaches
after discharge from the hospital. In the
face of these facts, the attorneys' most ele-
mentary duty imposed the necessary task
of securing a good medical examination
specifically directed to the complaint of
head injury. If the client, being a laborer,
could not pay for such an examination, the
attorney might explore the facilities of pub-
lic agencies. If the defendant offered an
examination, as he did in the case pre-
sented, the plaintiff's attorneys had a clear
duty to assure themselves that in the ex-
amination adequate and competent atten-
tion should be given to the head complaint,
and that the full and exact results of the
examination should be available to them.
It is, then, perfectly clear that this laborer's
attorneys breached their duty to him, and
vi6lated his strict right.
That the laborer suffered real loss as a
result of that breach seems equally clear
from the statement of facts: "The defend-
ant paid .a sum which amply compensated
the plaintiff for his shoulder injury, and the
plaintiff gave a general release as to per-
sonal injuries, 'whether developed or un-
developed, resulting or to result' from the
accident." In our earlier discussion, it was
shown that the laborer's Parkinsonism
would serve as sufficient matter for a state-
ment of a cause of action. An assertion of
a physical ill which reasonably may be re-
lated to an impact for which the defendant
is or may be legally responsible states a
cause of action for damages. With nothing
more, the laborer had a moral right, created
by the law, to come into court with evi-
dence of the facts and argument on the
question of law. That right he unknowingly
abandoned, at least for practical purposes,
because his lawyers advised him to sign the
general release without knowledge of the
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facts that he had Parkinsonism and that
his diseased condition may be causally re-
lated to the head impact.
It may be said that while the plaintiff's
attorneys' undutiful omissions were, in
themselves, sufficient to cause his harm if
the settlement had been reached upon their
statement of the nature of his injuries, yet
the deception practiced by the defendant's
attorney intervened and became the immedi-
ate cause of that harm, The proper answer to
this difficulty is the principle "causa causae
est causa causatae" (the cause of a cause
is the cause of that cause's effect). Their un-
dutiful omissions made it possible for the
fraud to harm their client, and the preven-
tion of any harm which might come to him
by such fraud was an integral part of their
duty to him. If the facts showed that they
had taken any step to control the conduct
and reports of the examination made by the
defendant's doctors, we would have to ex-
amine two further questions: "Was the
step taken a reasonably adequate perform-
ance of their duty?" and "If not, was it
such part performance as might require
the duty of restitution to be pro-rated be-
tween them and the defendant and his at-
torney?" Since they failed completely in
their duty to prevent fraud, their omissions
can be taken as fully efficacious of their
client's harm. If they had theological fault
in making these omissions, they are as fully
bound to make restitution as are the defend-
ant and his attorney. The defendant, as
presently enjoying the fruits of the harm
inflicted, would have the prior duty, but
it would seem that the plaintiff's attorneys
cannot claim that the duty of the defen-
dant's attorney is prior to their own.
Now we come to the third premise
necessary to establish that the duty of
restitution has been incurred by the plain-
DISCLOSURE
tiff's attorneys. It seems impossible to judge
whether or not they acted with theological
fault, realizing that their omissions were
immoral and unjust acts, endowed with a
probable potential to harm their client in
the way he has been harmed in fact. This
difficulty arises, of course, because the case
is stated upon information given by the de-
fendant's attorney only. For this reason, we
know nothing of the actual state of mind in
which the plaintiff's attorneys made their
undutiful omissions. We could speculate
that men of average intelligence must have
acted in a guilty manner, either at the time
when they were dealing with this case, or at
an earlier time when they settled their
policy for dealing with such cases. It is not
too much to suppose that no man with a
modicum of legal training could be totally
unaware of the duty to inform himself of
the nature of his client's cause of action.
And it is not an attribution of the ultimate
in perspicacity to say that he must have
realized that to omit proper medical exam-
ination and report in personal injury ac-
tions must result in some clients' giving
releases not adequately compensated. But
to pursue the discussion upon such gen-
eralities would not be very fruitful.
The Defense Attorney's Duty to Warn
the Laborer of His Present Peril
One is bound by the virtue of justice to
prevent or to stop a direct, though unin-
tended, effect of his unjust act if that effect
is now bringing or threatening to bring
harm to another. In our prior discussion of
this case, it was established that the attorney
for the defendant acted unjustly when he
made the laborer believe he has no diseased
condition symptomatized by the headaches
he has suffered since leaving the hospital.7
This belief, as was seen, practically pre-
vents the laborer from getting a diagnosis
of his Parkinsonism. If the disease con-
tinues long to develop without diagnosis
and treatment, its effects will be very much
more painful and disabling. Therefore, it
is concluded, the defendant's attorney is
bound in justice to let the laborer have
such knowledge of his condition as will off-
set the present peril created directly by the
lawyer's wrongful deception.
It does not seem that the lawyer is in
such ignorance of this duty that he may be
subjectively guiltless if he fails to perform
it. A month after the settlement was made,
this lawyer realized that his past conduct
may have imposed upon him some present
duty to aid the laborer. It was this realiza-
tion which caused him to inquire whether
such duty exists and what its scope may be.
He has had a reasoned answer. Unless he
can find flaws in the reasoning which war-
rant him to reject the answer as incorrect
or inconclusive, he will act immorally if he
does not act according to the counsel given.
Has the Defendant a Similar Duty
to Warn the Laborer?
If the defendant was a positive co-oper-
ator, as this term was explained above, in
the deception practised by his attorney,
then the laborer's peril is a direct effect of
an unjust act of the defendant. In such
case, there is no doubt that the defendant's
duty to warn the laborer is the same as his
attorney's duty.
An act of the defendant, co-operating in
his lawyer's fraud by mandate, counsel, or
consent, would be an act efficaciously caus-
7 Cahill, Solution of the Disclosure Problem, 4
CATHOLIC LAWYER 254, 257-58 (Summer 1958).
ative of the laborer's deception and his
present danger. That such act's causation
was not immediate, having operated through
the lawyer, would not make the causation
indirect. The causation is direct because the
mandate, advice or consent had, in its cir-
cumstances, an inherent tendency to pro-
duce the deception and the peril.
Even if the defendant was not a guilty
co-operator, because he was ignorant of
his lawyer's tactics in the negotiation, the
defendant has now a duty not to increase
the laborer's peril. He would increase it if,
in fulfilling his duty to make restitution
in respect of the laborer's claim, he di-
rectly confirmed the laborer's persuasion
that the headaches are not symptomatic of
any disease for which he can have effective
diagnosis and treatment. Justice forbids
him to permit his restitution to have that
effect. Charity imposes the duty to use
such methods of making restitution as will
not confirm the laborer's dangerous per-
suasion even indirectly. Charity also im-
poses the duty affirmatively, to warn the
laborer, if the defendant now knows of the
laborer's peril, even though the defendant,
because he knew not the character of his
lawyer's tactics, was not a guilty co-opera-
tor therein.
Have the Plaintiff s Attorneys a
Similar Duty to Warn the Laborer?
Whether or not they acted with theologi-
cal fault when they caused the laborer's
mistaken estimate of his present condition,
they are bound by justice to warn him of
his danger, provided, of course, that they
are now aware of the evil which threatens
him.
The duty which justice imposes, to pre-
vent or to stop the unjustly harmful direct
effects of one's conduct, does not, as does
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the duty of restitution, postulate that the
conduct was done with theological fault.
The laborer's peril is a direct effect of his
attorneys' omissions because their failure
to deal skillfully and zealously with their
client's claim had, in the circumstances, an
inherent tendency to harm their client un-
justly by putting him in this peril of greater
suffering and disability.
The Obligations of the Wrongdoers
Inter Sese
Because the defendant himself and the
attorneys for the plaintiff made no contri-
bution to the statement upon which we
have attempted to resolve the case, we can-
not say confidently that these three men in-
curred subjective guilt or theological fault
in the acts by which the plaintiff was un-
justly led to release the head injury aspect
of his cause of action and defrauded of
compensation therefor. Since theological
fault is a necessary premise of the duty of
restitution for harm, we can say that these
men have this duty only by supposing, with-
out clear support from the statement of
the case, that. when they caused this harm
they !acted with knowledge that their acts
or omissions were immoral, unjust to the
plaintiff, and capable of causing him the
harm which has eventuated. With respect
to the plaintiff's attorneys, we make a
further supposition: that each of them was
at least a positive co-operator with the mem-
ber or members of their firm who handled
the plaintiff's case.
Upon these hypotheses, all three at-
torneys and the defendant are severally
bound in justice to make entire restitution
for the plaintiff's harm. The priority of ob-
ligation is clearly against the defendant, as
present possessor of the fruits of injustice.
None of these men has a duty of justice
DISCLOSURE
to contribute to the one who actually makes
restitution.
Upon the alternative hypothesis that the
defendant was not a theologically guilty
co-operator in the injustice, but that he now
knows that he has been a "possessor in
good faith of the goods of another" by
reason of the immunity he enjoys as against
suit by the plaintiff, the defendant is still
bound to make restitution, and his obliga-
tion is prior to the obligations of the
attorneys. This alternative does not change
the conclusion that none of the four has
a duty of contribution to any other wrong-
doer.
Supposing that all four men know now
of the laborer's peril, each is bound by
justice to warn him of it. There is no
priority here, and no right of contribution
for damages incurred by one who gives the
warning.
Finally, each of these duties is subject
to postponement for cause, that is, by
reason of physical or moral impossibility.
Those causes were explained in the initial
discussion.8
8 Id. at 258, 261.
THE LEGAL COUNSELOR
(Continued)
the Divine Master and the fruit of His
work of Redemption. The same ideal which
inspires your daily activity on behalf of
individuals will motivate the endeavors
which you have undertaken on an inter-
national plane. Who can fail to see the
priceless contribution which you will thus
make to the consolidation of this larger
community and to the maintenance of the
peace desired by all men of good will? The
Church, which labors with all its might to
the same end, cannot but rejoice.
And so, in repeating Our wishes for your
success, We implore the blessings of Al-
mighty God on you and your families: As
a token of these good wishes, We impart
to you Our paternal Apostolic Blessing.
